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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JOHN SOTER and TOM SOTER,
Plaintiffs arnd Appellamts,
-vs.Civil No.
ZEKE SNYDER and STREVELLp ATERSON FINANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

6180

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to cancel and rescind a leasH and
conditional sales agreement, both documents having been
entered into on the 14th day of November, 1952, between
the plaintiffs as lessees and purchasers and the defendant Zeke Snyder as lessor and seller. The defendant
Strevell-Paterson Finance Company is alleged to be the
pledgee of the instruments for a loan procured from it
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by defendant Snyder. The complaint also prays for
judgment against Snyder in the sum of $12,400.00 paid
in connection with the conditional sales agreement (Tr.
1-11).
Plaintiffs allege, as the inducement for the execution
of the lease and conditional sales agreement, that Snyder
fraudulently represented the business theretofore conducted on the leased premises, the Delmar Lounge at 315
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to be a profitable one; that the net profit realized for each of the two
prior years was approximately $7800.00 and that the
gross sales for each of the two years prior to the execution of the agreements exceeded the sum of $50,000.00
(Tr. 1). The plaintiffs allege that in truth and in fact,
as Snyder well knew, the representations were false in
that the business had not been a profitable one and had
not realized the profit claimed to have been made nor had
the business grossed over $50,000.00 in sales for the two
years preceding the agreement (Tr. 2).
The defendant Snyder denied the allegations of
fraud, pleaded estoppel and a waiver of any alleged fraud
and, by counterclaim, a breach of the conditional sales
agreement, prayed judgment for the unpaid balance with
interest and costs of suit and that the payment of the
judgment "be secured by the defendant Zeke Snyder's
title retaining lien upon all of the personal property covered in said contract." (Tr.12-14).
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In an amendment to the answer both defendants
pleaded further estoppels against the plaintiffs, one to
the effect that on February 24, 1953 the plaintiffs approved the conditional sales agreement and, in writing,
stated that they had no charge-off or set-off against
the amount to which they were then allegedly indebted
to the defendant Snyder, and the other that the plaintiffs
knew Snyder was negotiating for a loan from the defendant corporation and that the statement of the balance
due on the agreement was a condition precedent to the
making of such loan (Tr. 16-18).
The case was tried to a jury, .which returned a special verdict on two propositions, to-wit:
"Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to
John and Tom Soter: 'I grossed over $50,000.00
in 1951."' (Tr. 245).
"Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to
John and Tom Soter: 'In 1951 I made a net profit
of between seven thousand and eight thousand
dollars.' " ( Tr. 246).
The trial court entered findings and conclusions of
law on the jury's special verdict (Tr. 249-251), declared
the conditional sales agreement in default and ordered
judgment of no cause of action against the plaintiffs and
a judgment in favor of Snyder in the sum of $10,600.00,
with interest from the 2nd day of October, 1953 at the
rate of 6% per annum "and that upon the payment in
full of said judgment together with interest, defendant
Zeke Snyder shall deliver to the plaintiffs John Soter and
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Tom Soter full title to all of the pe-rsonal property set
forth in that certain Conditional Sales Agreement dated
November 14, 1952."
The Conditional Sales Agreement, Exhibit B attached to the complaint (Tr. 3-6), provides in paragraph
6 thereof that if the purchasers shall fail and neglect
to make any of the payments specified or within 30 days
thereafter, then the seller may at his option declare the
entire sum then remaining unpaid to be due and payable
and upon failure of the purchasers to pay said sum seller
may retake possession of the property. The purchasers
by said agreement, the plaintiffs herein, waive any action for trespass or damages for the retaking of the property and specifically agree that in that event the seller
may retain all installments previously paid by purchasers
as and for compensation for the use of said property
by the purchasers. It is to be noted that the agre·ement
does not contemplate a personal judgment against the
purchasers nor does it provide any remedy other than
repossession.
The clerk entered a judgment (Tr. 252) pursuant to
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, which
findings and conclusions omit any reference to the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel and the like urged
by each of the defendants and which matters are, therefore, not before this court on this appeal.
The judgment as entered is for no cause of action
as to the plaintiffs and for the sum of $10,600.00 in favor
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of the defendant Snyder on the Conditional Sales Agreement, with the language with respect to the delivery of
title upon payment of the judgment as set forth above.
The trial court in its instructions to the jury, Instruction No.11 (Tr. 241), instructed:
"You are instructed that the gross sales for
the Delmar Lounge in the year 1951 were $40,866.99, and that the net profits for that year were
not in excess of $2,321.28."
The defendant Snyder on direct examination testified in effect that he told the Soters that he made a good
living out of the Delmar because he had paid twentyeight hundred dollars a year on his home and that with
the life insurance that he carried on himself and his wife
he presumed it would cost him in the neighborhood of five
thousand dollars (Tr. 179). Snyder also testified on
direct examination that he made a statement with respect
to the amount of money that he was drawing out of the
business.

"Q. What did you
A.

say~

Seventy-eight hundred dollars-twenty-eight
hundred dollars payments on my home and
possibly five thousand living expenses." ( Tr.
179-180).

On cross examination Snyder testified that at the Canton
Cafe, where the deal was made (Tr. 172-173), he stated
that he had been making a good living out of the business.
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"Q. You told them further that you were paying
twenty-eight hundred dollars on your homeA.

That is right.

Q. -per year, and it cost you approximately five
thousand dollars to live yourself, your wife',s
insurance and your own insurance and your
necessities~

A.

That is correct.

Q.

So five thousand added onto twenty-eight
hundred makes seventy-eight hundred dollars~

A.

That is correct.

Q.

That's what you told them that you were
taking out of the business~

A.

That is right." (Tr. 201-202).

The Soters testified that Snyder stated that he was
not only clearing between seven and eight hundred dollars a year, but that he was grossing fifty thousand to
sixty thousand a year and had grossed over fifty thousand dollars for the year 1951 (Tr. 27). While Snyder
denied that he stated that his gross business was from
fifty to sixty thousand dollars a year and specifically in
the year 1951 (Tr. 179), he, nevertheless, admitted saying that his gross business averaged fifty thousand dollars a year ~ot including 1952, and failed to mention
that in 1951 his business had dropped down to approximately forty thousand dollars (Tr. 206).
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After the return of the special verdict a motion fo~
new trial was timely made ( Tr. 254), one of the grounds
being that of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict and judgment and that the judgment and verdict
is against law and the evidence, which motion was thereafter denied ( Tr. 255).
We have not attempted to set forth above all of the
evidence in the case but only that part of the record sufficient, we believe, to warrant a reversal of the judgment
appealed from and to point to the error of the trial court
in denying the motion for a new trial, which we urge
upon the following:
STATEMENT OF' POINTS
POINT 1.
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT SNYDER DID NOT
STATE IN SUBSTANCE THAT HE GROSSED OVER FIFTY
THOUSAND DOLLARS IN 1951 IS CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND ALL OF THE REASONABLE IMPLICATIONS THEREOF.

POINT 2.
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT SNYDER DID NOT
STATE IN SUBSTANCE THAT IN 1951 HE MADE A NET
PROFIT OF BETWEEN SEVEN AND EIGHT THOUSAND
DOLLARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BUT
IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE TESTIMONY OF
SNYDER HIMSELF, BOTH ON DIRECT AND CROSS EXAMINATION.
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POINT 3.
THE JUDGMENT OF $10,600.00 IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT SNYDER IS A MONEY JUDGMENT WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO THE ·CONTRACT OF THE
PARTIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
WHERE THERE IS AN ENTIRE F AlLURE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT, THE VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT WILL BE SET ASIDE.

This court has repeatedly held that in a law case, if
there is any substantial competent evidence to support
the findings, they will not be disturbed. See Sproul v.
Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436, and Wyatt v. Baughman, ______ Utah ______ , 239 P. 2d 193. But where there· is
no substantial evidence in the case to support the finding
then the judgment will be set aside. Carter v. Standard
Ace. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259.
We proceed upon the premise that the verdict must
be plainly wrong and if it be manifestly against the
weight of the evidence it is the duty of the court to set it
aside. People v. Swazey, 6 Utah 93, 21 P. 400, and United
States v. Brown, 6 Utah 115, 21 P. 461. In the latter case
this Court stated:
"The only question presented is, does the evidence warrant the verdict~ In the case of U.S..
v. Harris, 19 Pac. Rep. 197, where the same question was presented, this court stated the principles
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which shall govern as follows : 'The jury are
the judge·s of the facts, and, in order to justify
this court in reversing the order refusing a new
trial, it must appear that there was an entire absence of evidence, or that the e·vidence so clearly
preponderates in favor of the prisoner as to suggest the possibility that the verdict was the result
of misapprehension or partiality. It is not enough
that the court might have arrived at a different
result.' We are satisfied with the rule thus stated,
and it only remains to test the case at bar by it."
The general rule is stated in 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and
Error, Section 890, pages 450-451, as follows:
"But while a reviewing court hesitates to set
aside a verdict on the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence, especially when the trial judge has
refused to do so, still if it is flagrantly contrary
to the evidence and the court is convinced that an
injustice has been done, it will and should set it
aside, not only in criminal, but also in civil, cases."
A special verdict or special findings of the jury are also
to be set aside if they have no support in the evidence or
are contrary thereto. To this effect is 53 Am. Jur., Trial,
Section 1089, pages 755-756:
"In the absence of evidence to support a material finding, it may be set aside or stricken from
the record, and in the discretion of the court judgment may be entered in accordance with the undisputed evidence in the case, or the verdict may
be set aside entirely and a new trial granted."
In the instant case it was a conceded fact, and the
court so instructed the jury by its Instruction No. 11, that
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gross sales for the Delmar Lounge in the year 1951 were
$40,866.99 and the net profits for that year not in excess
of $2,321.28. As to the gross business done for the year
1951 the issue was pin-pointed by the interrogatory to the
jury:
"The jury is directed to indicate with an X
in each question below whether they find proposition (A) or proposition (B) to be true. Before
you can find proposition numbered (A) in any
question to be true, it must be found by a clear
and convincing preponderance of the evidence.
(A) Zeke Snyder stated in substance to John
and Tom Soter : 'I grossed over $50,000.00 in
1951.'
(B) Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to
John and Tom Soter : 'I grossed over $50,000.00
in 1951.'
________________________ x ________________________ ." (Tr. 245)
Aside from the form of the so-called proposition
and the stripping from the same of the element of misrepresentation upon which the complaint is based and
which is the ultimate fact, as contrasted with the words
"did not state," the question submitted is still open to
what Snyder might have necessarily intended by his
statements because the question that the jury is to answer
is whether Snyder stated "in substance" that he grossed
over $50,000.00 in 1951. Literally Snyder testified :

"Q. Did you ever make the statement, Mr. Snyder,
to either Tom or John Soter or his father at
any time that you did fifty to sixty thousand
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dollars' worth of business a year and specifically in the year 1951 ~
A.

No.

Q. Were you ever asked a statement how much
business did you do in the year 1951 ~
A.

No." (Tr. 179).

By the use of the terms "state in substance" in the
so-called interrogatory we take the position that the court
did not intend that the jury construe the evidence in the
literal sense. We point to Snyder's testimony on cross
examination:

"Q. Yes. Now, Mr. Snyder, you stated that in this
conversation you had at the cafe· in response
to how much business you were making, that
you had been averaging around fifty thousand a year. Is that right~
A.

F·or the number of years that I have had it,
not including '52, the average, the approxi.mate average, in fact, I said approximately
fifty thousand dollars a year.

Q. You didn't mention that in 1951 the average
had dropped from fifty -seven thousand down
to forty thousand, did you~
A.

That wasn't an average." (Tr. 206).

Snyder's testimony conveys the definite idea, by way of a
representation, that there was no substantial difference
between the pin-pointed year of 1951 and the other years
as far as gross earnings were concerned, particularly in
light of the fact that he did not disclose that the gross
earnings in 1951 had dropped to $40,866.99.
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While special verdicts have their proper place, nevertheless they can be abused by over simplification which
works an injustice. It is submitted that the answer of the
jury as above set forth does not find support in the evidence and is in fact contrary thereto. The complaint
alleged the misrepresentation to be that the yearly gross
sales for two years prior to the transaction exceeded the
sum of $50,000.00.
The next proposition that the jury answered was as
follows:
"(A) Zeke Snyder stated in substance· to John
and Tom Soter: 'In 1951 I made a net profit of
between seven and eight thousand dollars.'
(B) Zeke Snyder did not state in substance to
John and Tom Soter : 'In 1951 I made a net profit
of between seven thousand and eight thousand
dollars.'
________________________x ________________________ ." (Tr. 246).
The answer that the jury made to the foregoing is contrary to the evidence. As pointed out above Snyder on
cross examination testified that at the Canton Cafe,
where the deal was made, he told the Soters that he had
been drawing out of the business seventy-eight hundred
dollars a year and that he so calculated the amount because he paid twenty-eight hundred dollars on his home
and expended approximately five thousand dollars in
living together with the payment of premiums on his and
his wife's insurance (Tr. 201-202). His testimony was
the same on direct examination (Tr.179).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
It is demonstrated, we believe, that the only two
propositions answered by the jury do not find support
in the evidence but are directly contrary thereto.
POINT 2.
THE JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE
DEFENDANT SNYDER IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO
THE .CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES..

Paragraph 6 of the Conditional Sales Agreement,
Exhibit A attached to the complaint (Tr. 3-6), provides
as follows:
"If the Purchaser shall fail or neglect to make
any of the payments specified, or within thirty
(30) days thereafter, then the Seller may, at his
option, declare the entire sum then remaining unpaid then to be due and payable and upon failure
of the Purcllasers to pay said sum, Seller may
retake possession of the said property, free from
all claims whatsoever, and to that end and without
notice to the Purchasers, the Seller is hereby authorized to enter said premises and without legal
process to take and remove said property. The
purchasers hereby waive any action for trespas~s
or damages therefor and Seller in that event may
retain all installments previously paid by Purchasers as and for compensation for the use of
said property by the Purchasers."
By the foregoing the parties have agreed that repossession of the property, title to which is reserved by
Snyder, is the only remedy in the event of a breach
of the contract by the Soters, the amounts theretofore
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paid by them being forfeited as fixed and liquidated damages for the use of the property. It is a familiar rule that
where the parties have bargained for a specific remedy
in the event of a breach of contract the court cannot rewrite the contract nor grant relief not so bargained for.
In Corbitn on Contracts, Vol. 3, Section 541, it is said:
"In judicial opinions it is often stated that
'the courts do not make a contract for the parties'
and that the parties must be content to perform
and to receive performance in accordance with
their own agreement. Such statement's are usually made in a case in which the court refuses to
make an implication that one party is asserting
and the other is denying. It is true that a court
never makes a contract for litigating parties; but
court and jury may find that the parties made a
contract when in fact they did not; and the court
may decree the existence and enforcement of a
quasi contract not created by mutual assent. Also,
when the parties have themselves so far satisfied
legal requirements that the court is willing to hold
that a contract has been made, it will compel performance in accordance with what it believes to be
required by good faith and fair dealing."
The judgment in the instant case in favor of the defendant Snyder and against the Soters for $10,600.00 is a
judgment for the balance of the purchase price and not
contemplated by the contract of the parties.
In the case of American-Lafrance Fire Engine Co.
v. Bagge, 276 P. 1066 (Cal.), it was held:
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"* * * the seller explicitly limited its right,
in the event of a failure to receive payment in
a certain amount during 120 days after the sale,
to repossess itself of the property mentioned in
the contract, and having set forth these facts in
its complaint in the first cause of action therein,
it proceeded to do exactly what the trial court
stated-'pleaded itself out of court.' It had but
one remedy under the conditional contract of sale,
and its pleadings show that the plaintiff has mistaken its remedy so far as the first cause of action
is concerned."
As in the American-Lafrance case, supra, the conditional sale contract in the instant case does not give
the seller an election as to whether he would repossess
himself of the property or declare the entire purchase
price due and institute suit for the unpaid portion thereof. Snyder's only remedy is to retake possession of the
property, retaining all installments previously paid by
the Soters as and for compensation for the use of the
property by them. This remedy is expressly contracted
for and the judgment of the trial court ignores the contract in both its letter and the spirt of the same· by granting a personal judgment for the unpaid balance in favor
of Snyder and against the Soters.
CONCLUSION
Our rules of procedure are calculated, of course, to
do substantial justice between the parties but the instant
case demonstrates, we believe, that an over simplification
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can have the opposite effect. A review of the entire form
of special verdict will disclose that the jurors, to hold
for the plaintiffs, would have been required to answer
eight questions and to hold for the defendants they were
required to answer but two questions, and that in answering the eight questions for the plaintiffs there would have
had to have been a constant reference back to questions
that might have already be·en answered. The form of
special verdict used in this case is confusing and, although not calculated to do so, had the effect of suggesting a course of least resistance for the seven of the eight
jurors returning the verdict to agree on the two questions
and then go about their own personal business. Such
precise pin-pointing is, we respectfully submit, contrary
to the realities of jury trials. But once a special verdict
has been returned with the answers reduced to a focal
point as was done in this case in the two questions that
the jury did answer then, when it is shown that the verdict is not supported by but is contrary to the evidence,
a new trial in the interests of justice should be promptly
granted. Furthermore, the judgment on Snyder's counterclaim should not be permitted to stand as the same is
contrary to the explicit language of the agreement and
the remedy bargained for by the parties.
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The judgment appealed from should be reversed and
the cause remanded with such instructions as to the Court
may seem proper.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY G. METOS
RAYS. McCARTY
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
and
FRED H. EVANS
Attorneys for Plaimtiffs and Appella;n.ts
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